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Although it is commonly believed that trade liberalization results in higher GDP, little is known
about its effects on poverty and inequality. This paper uses the sharp trade liberalization in India in
1991,  spurred  to  a  large  extent  by  external  factors,  to  measure  the  causal  impact  of  trade
liberalization on poverty and inequality in districts in India. Variation in pre-liberalization industrial
composition across districts in India and the variation in the degree of liberalization across industries
allow for a difference-in-difference approach, establishing whether certain areas benefited more
from, or bore a disproportionate share of the burden of liberalization. In rural districts where
industries more exposed to liberalization were concentrated, poverty incidence and depth decreased
by less as a result of trade liberalization, a setback of about 15 percent of India's progress in poverty
reduction over the 1990s. The results are robust to pre-reform trends, convergence and time-varying
effects of initial district-specific characteristics. Inequality was unaffected in the sample of all Indian
states in both urban and rural areas. The findings are related to the extremely limited mobility of
factors across regions and industries in India. The findings, consistent with a specific factors model
of trade, suggest that to minimize the social costs of inequality, additional policies may be needed
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
After the Second World War, India, along with other developing countries, chose a strategy of
import substitution as a means of industrializing. In the past two decades, however, many coun-
tries have begun to favor global economic integration, and in particular trade liberalization, as a
development strategy. Although there is a general presumption that trade liberalization results
in a higher Gross Domestic Product, much less is known about its eﬀects on income distribution.
The distributional impacts of trade are particularly important in developing countries, where in-
come inequality is typically pronounced and there are large vulnerable populations. If economic
integration leads to further growth in income inequality and an increase in the number of poor
in developing economies, the beneﬁts of liberalization may be realized at a substantial social
cost unless additional policies are devised to redistribute some of the gains from the winners to
the losers.
Standard economic theory (Hecksher-Ohlin model) predicts that gains to trade should ﬂow
to abundant factors, which suggests that in developing countries, unskilled labor would beneﬁt
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1most from globalization. The rising skill-premium in the U.S. is often cited in support of standard
trade theory. However, recently these sharp predictions have been challenged.1 According to
the new theories, trade liberalization could reduce the wages of unskilled labor even in a labor
abundant country, thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Moreover, even
if global economic integration induces faster economic growth in the long run and substantial
reductions in poverty, the adjustment might be costly, with the burden falling disproportionately
on the poor (Banerjee and Newman, 2004). Due to the ambiguity of the theory, the question of
how trade liberalization aﬀects poverty and inequality remains largely an empirical one.
Recent empirical work has attempted to address the question, focusing mostly on the eﬀect of
trade liberalization on within country income inequality. Studies using cross-country variation
typically ﬁnd little relationship between trade liberalization and levels or rates of change of
inequality.2 However, these studies face signiﬁcant problems: cross-country data may not be
comparable, sample sizes are small, and changes in liberalization may be highly correlated with
other variables important to income processes. A promising alternative is to use micro evidence
from household and industry surveys. Several studies examine the relationship between trade
reforms and skill-premia, returns to education, industry-premia, and the size of informal labor
markets. However, the ﬁndings of these studies are typically based on correlations and may
not always be given a causal interpretation. And while there is some evidence on the eﬀect of
liberalization on industrial performance and wage inequality, the literature has so far ignored
the next logical step: the impact of these performance changes on poverty.
This paper investigates the impact of trade reforms on poverty and inequality in Indian
districts. Does trade liberalization aﬀect everyone equally or does it help those who are already
relatively well oﬀ while leaving the poor behind? How does it aﬀect income distributions within
rural and urban areas? And is the eﬀect of liberalization felt equally across regions in India?
India presents a particularly relevant setting to seek the answers to these questions. First,
India is the home of one third of the world’s poor.3 Second, the nature of India’s trade
1See Davis (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Stiglitz (1970), Cunat and Maﬀezzoli (2001), Banerjee and
Newman (2004), Kremer and Maskin (2003).
2See Edwards (1997), Lundberg and Squire (1999), Rama (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Milanovic
(2002).
3Based on 2001 World Bank estimates. See http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/.
2liberalization—sudden, comprehensive and largely externally imposed—facilitates a causal inter-
pretation of the ﬁndings. India liberalized its international trade as part of a major set of
reforms in response to a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991. Extremely restrictive poli-
cies were abandoned: the average duty rate declined by more than half and the percentage of
goods importable without license or quantitative restriction rose sharply. The lower average
tariﬀs, combined with changes in the tariﬀ structure across industries, provide ample variation
to identify the causal eﬀects of trade policy on income processes.
Coincident with these tariﬀ reductions were signiﬁcant changes in the incidence of poverty
and income inequality. To determine whether there is a causal link between liberalization and
changes in poverty and inequality, this paper exploits the variation in the timing and degree
of liberalization across industries, and the variation in the location of industries in districts
throughout India. The interaction between the share of a district’s population employed by
various industries on the eve of the economic reforms and the reduction in trade barriers in
these industries provides a measure of the district’s exposure to foreign trade. In a regression
framework, this paper establishes whether district poverty and inequality are related to the
district-speciﬁc trade policy shocks. Because industrial composition is predetermined and trade
liberalization was sudden and externally imposed, it is appropriate to causally interpret the
correlation between the levels of poverty and inequality and trade exposure. Of course if there
were migration across districts in response to changes in factor prices, an analysis comparing
districts over time may not give the full extent of the impact of globalization on inequality
and poverty in India. However, the analysis still gives a well deﬁned answer to the question of
whether inequality and poverty increased more (or less) in districts that were aﬀected more by
trade liberalization.
The study ﬁnds that trade liberalization led to an increase in poverty and poverty gap in
the rural districts where industries more exposed to liberalization were concentrated. The eﬀect
is quite substantial. According to the most conservative estimates, compared to a rural district
experiencing no change in tariﬀs, a district experiencing the mean level of tariﬀ changes saw a 2
percent increase in poverty incidence and a 0.6 percent increase in poverty depth. This set back
represents about 15 percent of India’s progress in poverty reduction over the 1990s.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h i se x e r c i s ed o e sn o ts t u d yt h el e v e le ﬀect of liberalization on
3poverty in India, but rather the relative impact on areas more or less exposed to liberalization.
Thus, while liberalization may have had an overall eﬀect of increasing or lowering the poverty
rate and poverty gap, this paper captures the fact that these eﬀects were not equal throughout
the country, and certain areas and certain segments of the society beneﬁted less (or suﬀered
more) from liberalization.
The ﬁnding of any eﬀect of trade liberalization on regional outcomes is puzzling in the trade
theorist’s hypothetical world, where factors are mobile both across geographical regions within
a country and across industries. Factor reallocation would equate incidence of poverty across
regions. In a closely related study, Topalova (2004b) presents evidence that the mobility of
factors is extremely limited in India. The geographical inequalities are explained by the lack
of relocation: migration is remarkably low, with no signs of an upward trend after the 1991
reforms. Topalova (2004b) further examines the mechanisms through which trade liberalization
aﬀected poverty and inequality, establishing that the lack of geographical mobility is combined
with a lack of intersectoral mobility. Changes in relative output prices led to changes in relative
sector-returns to sector speciﬁc factors. As those employed in traded industries were not at the
top of the income distribution on the eve of the trade reform, the reduction in income caused
some to cross the poverty line or fall even deeper into poverty.
This study is related to several strands of literature. First, it ﬁts into the recent large
empirical literature on the eﬀects of trade reforms on wage inequality. This literature has largely
dealt with the experience of Latin American countries: Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Revenga
(1996), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Feliciano (2001), Goldberg et al. (2001) and Attanasio et
al. (2004). Currie and Harrison (1997) study the eﬀect of trade liberalization in Morocco. These
papers typically ﬁnd small eﬀects of trade on wage inequality of workers in the manufacturing
sector. This paper extends this type of analysis, by focusing not only on the eﬀect of trade
reforms on relative wages in manufacturing, but by looking at regional outcomes in general,
thus capturing how trade eﬀects seeped from the directly aﬀected manufacturing and agricultural
workers to the their dependents, as well as people involved in non-traded goods sectors.
This is also one of the ﬁrst studies to examine the link between trade liberalization and
poverty. So far Porto (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) have analyzed the relationship
between trade and poverty in the case of Argentina and Colombia respectively. While Porto’s
4approach has several advantages: it provides a general equilibrium analysis of the relationship
between trade liberalization and poverty, by simultaneously considering the labor market and
consumption eﬀects of trade liberalization, his results rely on simulations based on cross-sectional
data. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variation at the
industry level, ﬁnd little evidence of a link between the Colombian trade reforms and poverty.
Yet, as the study focuses on urban areas, and people involved in manufacture, it may be missing
the really poor. This paper relates plausibly exogenous changes in trade policy to poverty
and inequality, studying both manufacturing and agricultural workers in both urban and rural
areas. In addition, by deﬁning the district as the unit of observation, it overcomes important
selection and composition eﬀects that studies at the industry level may face. Finally, the paper
contributes to the literature on industry wage premia and their relation to trade protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Indian reforms
of 1991 focusing on trade liberalization while Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis.
In Section 4 the empirical strategy is explained, and the results follow in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Indian Trade Liberalization
India’s post-independence development strategy was one of national self-suﬃciency, and stressed
the importance of government regulation of the economy. Cerra et al. (2000) characterized it as
“both inward looking and highly interventionist, consisting of import protection, complex indus-
trial licensing requirements, pervasive government intervention in ﬁnancial intermediation and
substantial public ownership of heavy industry.” In particular, India’s trade regime was amongst
the most restrictive in Asia, with high nominal tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers, including a com-
plex import licensing system, an “actual user” policy that restricted imports by intermediaries,
restrictions of certain exports and imports to the public sector (“canalization”), phased man-
ufacturing programs that mandated progressive import substitution, and government purchase
preferences for domestic producers.
It was only during the second half of the 1980s, when the focus of India’s development
strategy gradually shifted toward export led growth, that the process of liberalization began.
5Import and industrial licensing were eased, and tariﬀs replaced some quantitative restrictions,
although even as late as 1989/90 a mere 12 percent of manufactured products could be imported
under an open general license; the average tariﬀ was still one of the highest, greater than 90
percent. (Cerra et al., 2000)
However, the gradual liberalization of the late 1980s was accompanied by a rise in macro-
economic imbalances–namely ﬁscal and balance of payments deﬁcits– which increased India’s
vulnerability to shocks. The sudden increase in oil prices due to the Gulf War in 1990, the
drop in remittances from Indian workers in the Middle East, and the slackened demand of im-
portant trading partners exacerbated the situation. Political uncertainty, which peaked in 1990
and 1991 after the poor performance and subsequent fall of a coalition government led by the
second largest party (Janata Dal) and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the chairman of the
Congress Party, undermined investor conﬁdence. With India’s downgraded credit-rating, com-
mercial bank loans were hard to obtain, credit lines were not renewed and capital outﬂows began
to take place.
To deal with its external payments problems, the government of India requested a stand-by
arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in August 1991. The IMF support
was conditional on an adjustment program featuring macroeconomic stabilization and structural
reforms. The latter focused on the industrial and import licenses, the ﬁnancial sector, the tax
system, and trade policy. On trade policy, benchmarks for the ﬁrst review of the Stand-By
Arrangement included a reduction in the level and dispersion of tariﬀs and a removal of a large
number of quantitative restrictions (Chopra et al., 1995). Speciﬁc policy actions in a number
of areas — notably industrial deregulation, trade policy and public enterprise reforms, and some
aspects of ﬁnancial sector reform — also formed the basis for a World Bank Structural Adjustment
Loan, as well as sector loans.
The government’s export-import policy plan (1992-97) ushered in radical changes to the
trade regime by sharply reducing the role of the import and export control system. The share of
products subject to quantitative restrictions decreased from 87 percent in 1987/88 to 45 percent
in 1994/95. The actual user condition on imports was discontinued. All 26 import licensing lists
were eliminated and a “negative” list was established (Hasan et al., 2003). Thus, apart from
goods in the negative list, all goods could be freely imported (subject to import tariﬀs) (Goldar,
62002). In addition to easing import and export restrictions, tariﬀs were drastically reduced
(Figure 1, Panel A and B). Average tariﬀs fell from more than 80 percent in 1990 to 37 percent
in 1996, and the standard deviation of tariﬀs dropped by 50 percent during the same period. The
structure of protection across industries changed (Figure 1 Panel G). Figure 1 Panel H shows
the strikingly linear relationship between the pre-reform tariﬀ levels and the decline in tariﬀst h e
industry experienced. This graph reﬂects the guidelines according to which tariﬀ reform took
place,4 namely reduction in the general level of tariﬀs, reduction of the spread or dispersion of
tariﬀ rates, simpliﬁcation of the tariﬀ system and rationalization of tariﬀ rates, along with the
abolition of numerous exemptions and concessions. Agricultural products, with the exception
of cereals and oil seeds, faced an equally sharp drop in tariﬀs, though the non-tariﬀ barriers
of these products were lifted only in the late 1990s (Figure 1, Panels C-F). There were some
diﬀerences in the magnitude of tariﬀ changes (and especially NTBs) according to industry use
type: i.e. Consumer Durables, Consumer Nondurables, Capital goods, Intermediate and Basic
goods (Figure 1, Panel D and F). Indian authorities ﬁrst liberalized Capital goods, Basic and
Intermediates, while Consumer Nondurables and agricultural products were slowly moved from
the “negative” list to the list of freely importable goods only in the second half of the 1990s. The
Indian Rupee was devalued 20 percent against the dollar in July 1991 and further devalued in
February 1992. By 1993, India had adopted a ﬂexible exchange rate regime (Ahluwalia, 1999).
Following the reduction in trade distortions, the ratio of total trade in manufactures to
GDP rose from an average of 13 percent in the 1980s to nearly 19 percent of GDP in 1999/00
(Figure 2). Export and import volumes also increased sharply from the early 1990s, outpacing
growth in real output (Figure 2). India’s imports were signiﬁcantly more skilled-labor intensive
than India’s exports and remained so throughout the 1990s, as shown in Figure 3 which plots
cumulative export and import shares by skill intensity in 1987, 1991, 1994 and 1997.
India remained committed to further trade liberalization, and since 1997 there have been
further adjustments to import tariﬀs. However, at the time the government announced the
export-import policy in the Ninth Plan (1997-2002), the sweeping reforms outlined in the pre-
vious plan had been undertaken and pressure for further reforms from external sources had
abated.
4The guidelines were outlined in the Chelliah report of The Tax Reform Commission constituted in 1991.
73D a t a
The data for this analysis were drawn from three main sources. Household survey data is avail-
able from the 1983-84, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 (“thick”) rounds of the Indian National
Sample Survey (NSS). The NSS provide household level information on expenditure patterns,
occupation, industrial aﬃliation (at the 3 digit NIC level) and various other household and
individual characteristics. The surveys usually cover all states in India and collect information
on about 75,000 rural and 45,000 urban households.5 Using this data, I construct district level
measures of poverty (measured as headcount ratio and poverty gap)6 a n di n e q u a l i t y( m e a s u r e d
as the standard deviation of the log of per capita expenditure and the logarithmic deviation of
per capita expenditure). Following Deaton (2003a, 2003b), I adjust these estimates in two ways.
First, I use the poverty lines proposed by Deaton as opposed to the ones used by the Indian
Planning Commission, which are based on defective price indices over time, across states and
between the urban and rural sector. The poverty lines are available for the 16 bigger states in
India and Delhi to which I restrict the analysis.7 In addition, the 1999-2000 round is not directly
comparable to the 1993-1994 round. The 1999-2000 round introduced a new recall period (7
days) along with the usual 30-day recall questions for the household expenditures on food, pan
and tobacco. Due to the way the questionnaire was administered, there are reasons to believe
that this methodology leads to an overestimate of the expenditures based on the 30-day recall
period, which in turn aﬀects the poverty and inequality estimates. To achieve comparability
with earlier rounds, I follow Deaton and impute the correct distribution of total per capita ex-
penditure for each district from the households’ expenditures on a subset of goods for which
5The NSS follows the Indian Census deﬁnition of urban and rural areas. To be classiﬁed urban, an area needs
to meet several criteria regarding size and density of the population, and the share of male working population
engaged in non-agricultural pursuits.
6These measures are explained in detail in Section 4.2. The head count ratio represents the proportion of
the population below the poverty line, while the poverty gap index is the normalized aggregate shortfall of poor
people’s consumption from the poverty line.
7Poverty lines were not available for some of the smaller states and union territories, namely: Arunachal
Pradesh, Goa, Daman and Diu, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura,
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Pondicherry, Lakshwadweep, Dadra Nagar and Haveli. The results
are not sensitive to the inclusion of these states, with poverty lines assumed to be the same as those of the
neighboring states.
8the new recall period questions were not introduced. The poverty and inequality measures were
derived from this “corrected” distribution. Throughout the 1990s there were substantial changes
in the administrative division of India, with districts’ boundaries changing as new districts were
carved out of existing ones. As I compare districts over time, I construct consistent time-series
of district identiﬁers using Census Atlases and other maps of India. These were also used to
match the NSS and Census district deﬁnitions.
For industrial data, I use the Indian Census of 1991, which reports the industry of em-
ployment at the 3-digit National Industrial Classiﬁcation (NIC) code for each district in India.
Because the Census does not distinguish among crops produced by agricultural workers, I use
the 43rd round of the NSS to compute agricultural employment district weights. There are
about 450 industry codes of which about 190 are traded agricultural, mining or manufacturing
industries.
Finally, I use tariﬀs to measure changes in Indian trade policy. While non-tariﬀ barriers
( N T B )h a v eh i s t o r i c a l l yp l a y e dal a r g er o l ei nI n d i a nt r a d ep o l i c y ,d a t aa r en o ta v a i l a b l ea ta
disaggregated enough level to allow the construction of a time-series of NTBs across sectors.8
Instead, I construct a database of annual tariﬀ data for 1987-2001 at the six-digit level of
the Indian Trade Classiﬁcation Harmonized System (HS) Code based on data from various
publications of the Ministry of Finance. I then match 5,000 product lines to the NIC Codes,
using the concordance of Debroy and Santhanam (1993), to calculate average industry-level
tariﬀs. The little data on NTBs available comes from various publication of the Directorate
General of Foreign Trade as well as the 1992 study of the Indian Trade Regime by Aksoy (1992).
4 Empirical Strategy
The Indian liberalization was externally imposed, comprehensive, and the Indian government
had to meet strict compliance deadlines. The period immediately before the reform, and the
ﬁve-year plan immediately following, give rise to an excellent natural experiment. India’s large
8In addition, the experience of other developing countries shows that NTB coverage ratios are usually highly
correlated with tariﬀs, thus estimates based on tariﬀs may capture the combined eﬀect of trade policy changes
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004). This relationship seems to hold in the case of India as well, based on the patchy
data available.
9size and diversity (India was divided into approximately 450 districts in 27 states at the time
of the 1991 Census) allows for a cross-region research design. The identiﬁcation strategy is
straightforward: districts whose industries faced larger liberalization shocks are compared to
those whose industries remained protected. Gordon Hanson employs a similar strategy in his
study of the eﬀect of globalization on labor income in Mexico in this volume.
However, unlike Hanson’s, the identiﬁcation strategy of this paper exploits variation in the
“initial” industrial composition across districts in India and the timing of liberalization across
industries. I construct a measure of district trade exposure as the average of industry-level
tariﬀs weighted by the workers employed in that industry in 1991 as a share of all registered
workers. The variation in industrial composition will generate diﬀerential response of the district
level trade exposure to the exogenous changes in tariﬀs. In a regression framework, the baseline
speciﬁcation takes the following form:
ydt = α + β · Tariﬀdt + γt + δd + εdt (1)
Where ydt is district level outcome such as measures of poverty and inequality, and Tariﬀdt is
the district exposure to international trade. The coeﬃcient of interest, β, captures the average
eﬀect of trade protection on regional outcomes. The inclusion of district ﬁxed eﬀects (δd) absorbs
unobserved district-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the determinants of poverty and inequality, while
the year dummies (γt) control for macroeconomic shocks that aﬀect equally all of India.
The above methodology will capture the short to medium-run eﬀect of trade liberalization in
a speciﬁc district. Note that in the presence of perfect factor mobility across regions, one would
expect no eﬀect of liberalization on regional outcomes. If workers can easily migrate in response
to adverse price changes, the eﬀect of liberalization captured in β would be zero. A further
advantage of this identiﬁcation strategy is that it will uncover the general equilibrium eﬀect
of trade liberalization within a geographical unit. Previous studies have focused on the eﬀect
of trade opening on manufacturing workers, who, in developing countries, typically represent a
small fraction of the population, though often a large share of income. This strategy will capture
not only the eﬀect of trade liberalization on manufacturing and agricultural workers, but also
on their dependents, and individuals in allied sectors.
It is important to emphasize that this empirical strategy can not tell us anything about the
10ﬁrst order eﬀect of trade on poverty. First, trade liberalization is likely to have eﬀects common
across India, through prices, availability of new goods, faster growth etc.9 Second, it would
be very diﬃcult to draw a causal lesson using only time variation in trade liberalization and
poverty levels, since the Indian economy was subject to numerous other inﬂuences over the
period studied. This study, based on regional variation, does not reﬂect these eﬀects, and does
not seek to answer questions about overall levels. Instead, it answers the questions of whether all
district derived similar beneﬁts (or suﬀered similar costs) from liberalization, or whether some
areas suﬀered disproportionately. This is an important question for policy makers who might
need to devise additional policies to redistribute some of the gains from the winners to those
who do not win as much in order to minimize potential social cost of inequality.
The balance of this section addresses two potential complications. First, the process of trade
liberalization is explored in detail, including the possibility that liberalization was correlated
with other factors that aﬀect regional poverty and inequality. Second, the measures used to
quantify poverty and inequality are described, including careful attention to possible problems
with the data, and their solution.
4.1 Endogeneity of Trade Policy
There are strong theoretical reasons (Grossman and Helpman, 2002) to believe that in the
absence of external pressure, trade policy is an endogenous outcome to political and economic
processes. As the empirical strategy of this paper exploits the interaction of regional industrial
composition and diﬀerential degree of liberalization across industries to identify the eﬀect of
trade liberalization on poverty and inequality, understanding the source of variation in the tariﬀ
levels is of utmost importance. In particular, there are two dimensions that suggest endogeneity
of trade policy may be a concern. First, the initial decrease in tariﬀs might have been just
a continuation of a secular trend. The timing of trade reform might have reﬂected Indian
authorities’ perception of domestic industries as mature enough to face foreign competition, and
labor and credit markets as ﬂexible enough to ease the intersectoral reallocation that would
ensue. Second, the cross-sectional variation in levels of protection might be related to economic
and political factors. The relatively less eﬃcient industries might have enjoyed higher degree of
9To a certain extent the eﬀect of cheaper goods should be reﬂected in the deﬂators for the poverty lines.
11protection; the political strength of labor as well as business is also often cited as a determinant
of trade protection. If less productive industries or industries with higher lobbying ability are
more concentrated in poorer areas, then one might see a positive correlation between district
poverty rates and the district level tariﬀs. These two concerns are addressedin sequence below.
As already discussed in Section 2, the external crisis of 1991 opened the way for market-
oriented reforms in India, such as trade liberalization. The Indian government required IMF
support to meet external payments obligations, and was thus compelled to accept the conditions
that accompanied the support. “Given several earlier attempts to avoid IMF loans and the
associated conditionalities, the large number of members of the new cabinet who had been
cabinet members in past government with inward-looking trade policies and the heavy reliance
on tariﬀs as a source of revenues, these reforms came as a surprise.” (Hasan et al., 2003).
According to a study on the political economy of economic policy in India, “the new policy
package was delivered swiftly in order to complete the process of changeover so as not to permit
consolidation of any likely opposition to implementation of the new policies. The strategy
was to administer a ‘shock therapy’ to the economy...There was no debate among oﬃcials or
economists prior to the oﬃcialadoption...Theneweconomicpolicydidnotoriginateoutofan
analysis of the data and information or a well thought out development perspective,” (Goyal,
1996).10
Varshney (1999) describes the political environment in which the trade reforms were passed.
Mass political attention at the time was focused on internal politics (ethnic conﬂict in particular),
and trade reforms pushed through by a weak coalition government apparently escaped general
attention, in contrast to the failed reform attempts of the much stronger Congress Party in 1985.
As late as 1996, fewer than 20% of the electorate had any knowledge of the trade reform, while
80% had opinions on whether India should implement caste-based aﬃrmative action. While
some liberalization eﬀorts (for example privatization) were diluted or delayed due to popular
opposition, trade liberalization was generally successful. As Bhagwati wrote: “Reform by storm
10This view is conﬁrmed in a recent interview with Dr. Chelliah, one of the masterminds of the reforms
"We didn’t have the time to sit down and think exactly what kind of a development model we needed...there
was no systematic attempt to see two things; one, how have the beneﬁts of reforms distributed, and two, ul-
timately what kind of society we want to have, what model of development should we have?", July 5, 2004
http://in.rediﬀ.com/money/2004/jul/05inter.htm
12has supplanted the reform by stealth of Mrs. Gandhi’s time and the reform with reluctance
under Rajiv Gandhi.”
There are several reasons why trade policy remained part of elite politics. Trade constitutes
a relatively small part of GDP in India. Though tariﬀs were vastly reduced, consumer goods
and agricultural products were initially not liberalized. And though there surely is an important
link between mass welfare and trade policy, even when trade is a small share of the national
product, these links are subtle and not yet established empirically.
Even if the timing of the sharp drop in average tariﬀs (Figure 1) appears exogenous, there
is signiﬁcant variation in the tariﬀ changes across industries, which could confound inference.
More precisely, it is important to understand whether the changes in tariﬀsr e ﬂected authorities’
perceptions on industry’s ability to compete internationally, or the lobbying power of the indus-
try. Ideally, this concern could be alleviated by knowledge of the “true” intentions of Indian
policymakers or, failing that, through a detailed study of the political economy behind tariﬀ
changes in India over the period. In the absence of objective and detailed analyses of such
policy changes, the data may be examined for possible confounding relationships.
First, I examine to what extent tariﬀs moved together. An analysis of the tariﬀ changes of
the 5,000 items in the dataset for 1992-96, the Eighth Plan, and for 1997-2001, the Ninth Plan,
suggests that movements in tariﬀs were strikingly uniform until 1997 (Figure 4). During the
ﬁrst 5-year that incorporated the economic reforms of 1991, India had to meet certain exter-
nally imposed benchmarks, and the majority of tariﬀ changes across products exhibited similar
behavior (either increased, decreased, or remained constant). After 1997, tariﬀ movements were
not as uniform. This suggests that policymakers were more selective in setting product tariﬀs
during 1997-2001, and the problem of potential cross-sectional endogenous trade protection is
more pronounced.
Second, there is no evidence that policymakers adjusted tariﬀs according to industry’s per-
ceived productivity during the Eighth Plan, i.e. until 1997. In a related study, Topalova (2004a)
tests whether current productivity levels predict future tariﬀs — a relationship one would expect if
policymakers were indeed trying to protect less eﬃcient industries. Topalova (2004a) found that
the correlation between future tariﬀs and current productivity, and future tariﬀsa n dc u r r e n t
productivity growth is indistinguishable from zero for the 1989-96 period. For the period after
131997 however, future tariﬀ levels seem to be negatively and statistically signiﬁcantly correlated
with current productivity. This evidence and the evidence on uniformity in tariﬀ movements
until 1997 suggest it may not be appropriate to use trade policy variation after 1997. This study
thus focuses on the 1987-1997 period.
A third check uses data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to test for “political
protection.” Even if the change in industry tariﬀs appears uncorrelated with the initial produc-
tivity of the industry, tariﬀs may be correlated with politically important characteristics of the
ﬁrm. Using data from the ASI, (which covers manufacturing and mining sectors), and following
the literature on political protection, I regress the change in tariﬀs between 1987 and 1997 on
various industrial characteristics in 1987.11 These characteristics include employment size (a
larger labor force may lead to more electoral power and more protection), output size, average
wage (policy makers may protect industries where relatively low skilled/vulnerable workers are
employed), concentration (as measured by the average factory size, this captures the ability of
producers to organize political pressure groups to lobby for more protection), and share of skilled
workers. The results are presented in Table 1, Panel A. Tariﬀ changes are not correlated with
any of the industry characteristics.
Because agricultural workers are not included in the ASI data, but comprise a large share
of India’s population, I conduct a similar exercise using data from the 1987 NSS. I estimate for
all industries the average per capita expenditure, wage, poverty rate and poverty depth at the
industry level, and I check whether there is a correlation between these industry characteristics
and tariﬀ declines. Results, presented in Table 1, Panel B, show no signiﬁcant relationship
between tariﬀ changes and these measures of workers’ wellbeing, once controls for industry use
type are included.
A possible explanation for these results can be found in Gang and Pandey (1996). They
conducted a careful study of the determinants of protection across manufacturing sectors across
three plans, 1979-80, 1984-85 and 1991-92, showing that none of the economic and political fac-
tors are important in explaining industry tariﬀ levels in India.12 They explain the phenomenon
11I use 1987 as the pre-reform year since the data on pre-reform poverty and inequality comes from the 43rd
round of the NSS which was collected in 1987. The results are robust to using 1988 or 1990 as the “pre” year.
12In other developing countries, protection tends to be highest for unskilled, labor-intensive sectors. See Gold-
berg and Pavcnik (2001), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Currie and Harrison (1997) for evidence from Colombia,
14with the hysteresis of policy: trade policy was determined in the Second Five Year Plan and
never changed, even as the circumstances and natures of the industries evolved.
The evidence presented here suggests that the diﬀerential tariﬀ changes across industries
between 1991 and 1997 were as unrelated to the state of the industries as can be reasonably
hoped for in a real-world setting.
One big exception to the otherwise haphazard pattern of tariﬀ reductions are two major
agricultural crops: cereals and oilseeds. Throughout the period of study, the imports of cereals
and oilseeds remained canalized (only government agencies were allowed to import these items)
and no change in their tariﬀ rates was observed (the tariﬀ rate for cereals was set at 0). Thus,
they were de facto non-traded goods. The delay in the liberalization of these major agricultural
crops was due to reasons of food security. However, the cultivators of these crops were also
among the poorest in India. This brings some additional complications in the analysis, which
are discussed at length in the following sections.
4.2 Measurement and Basic Patterns of Poverty and Inequality
Measuring poverty and inequality is not a trivial task. For poverty, I use both the “headcount
ratio” (HCR) and the poverty gap. The former, which I refer to as the poverty rate, represents
the proportion of the population below the poverty line. While the HCR is widely used, it does
not capture the extent to which diﬀerent households fall short of the poverty line, and is highly
sensitive to the number of poor households near the poverty line. Thus, I also analyze the poverty
gap index, deﬁned as the normalized aggregate shortfall of poor people’s consumption from the
poverty line.13,14 Figure 5 plots the evolution of poverty in India, and indicates a substantial
decline over the past two decades.
Mexico and Morocco respectively.
13Both the headcount ratio and the poverty gap are members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty





¢αf(y)dy, where z is the poverty line and incomes are distributed according to
the density function f(y). The headcount ratio is calculated by setting α to be 0, and the poverty gap by setting
α to be 1.
14Since the survey design changed for the 1999-2000 round of the NSS, in order to obrain internally consistent
measurement of poverty and inequality, the per capita expenditure data was adjusted at the district level, following
Deaton (2003).
15I chose two measures of inequality, the standard deviation of log consumption and the mean
logarithmic deviation of consumption,15 both because they are standard measures, and because
similar values are obtained when they are estimated from either the micro data or the estimated
distributions. In contrast to poverty’s steady decline, inequality follows a more complicated
pattern. While it registered a substantial decline between 1987 and 1993, both measures record
a break in that trend and a slight increase in inequality after 1993 in rural India. In urban India,
after a period of decline, inequality rose between 1993 and 1999.
As mentioned above, the measure of trade policy is the tariﬀ that a district faces, calculated
as the 1991 employment weighted average nominal ad-valorem tariﬀ at time t.16 Table A1
in the appendix provides summary statistics of the variables included in the analysis at the
district level, including a breakdown of the workers across broad industrial categories. In the
average rural district about 80 percent of main17 workers are involved in agriculture, of whom
87 percent are involved in cultivation of cereals and oilseeds. Mining and manufacturing account
for about 6 percent of the workers and the remaining 12 percent are involved in services, trade,
transportation, and construction. In urban India agricultural workers represent only 19 percent,
of which 73 percent are cultivators of cereals and oilseeds. Manufacturing and mining workers
account for another ﬁfth of the urban population and the remaining three ﬁfths comprise workers
in services etc.
The district level tariﬀs are computed as follows:
Tariﬀd,t =
P
i Workerd,i,1991 ∗ Tariﬀi,t
Total Workerd,1991
Tariﬀd,t is a “scaled” version of district tariﬀs. In this measure, workers in non-traded industries
15The mean deviation of consumption is part of the family of Generalized Entropy coeﬃcients. It is calculated




y)f(y)dy, where µ is mean income.
16As described in the Data section, the 1991 population and housing census is used to compute employment by
industry for each district. The employment data is available for the urban and rural sector separately by industry
at the 3 digit (NIC) level for all workers except agricultural workers. To match agricultural workers to the tariﬀ
data, I compute district employment weights from the 43rd round of the National Sample Survey (July 1987-June
1988).
17The 1991 Indian census divides workers into two categories: “main” and “marginal” workers. Main workers
include people who worked for 6 months or more during the year, while marginal workers include those who
worked for a shorter period. Unpaid farm and family enterprise workers are supposed to be included in either the
main worker or marginal worker category, as appropriate.
16are assigned zero tariﬀ for all years. These are workers in services, trade, transportation, con-
struction as well as all workers involved in growing of cereals and oilseeds. The latter assumption
is justiﬁed by the fact that all product lines of these two industries were canalized (imports were
allowed only to the state trading monopoly) as late as 2000.18 Furthermore, the tariﬀso fa l l
product lines under the growing of cereals industry are 0 throughout the entire period of interest.
One concern with the use of Tariﬀd,t is that it is very sensitive to the share of people
involved in non-traded industries, the majority of whom are the cereal and oilseed growers.
Since agricultural workers are usually at the bottom of the income distribution, Tariﬀd,t is
correlated with initial poverty levels. The interpretation of results based on this measure may
be unclear if there were (for other reasons) convergence across districts. In particular, poorer
districts, which have a large fraction of agricultural workers may experience faster reduction in
poverty due to mean-reversion or convergence. These districts may also record a lower drop
in tariﬀs, since initially the Tariﬀd,t measure is low. Thus, one might ﬁnd a spurious negative
relationship between tariﬀs and poverty and erroneously conclude that trade liberalization led
to a relative increase in poverty at the district level. Alternatively, if workers in non-traded
activities are on a diﬀerent growth path than those in traded industries, Tariﬀd,t might capture
this diﬀerential growth, rather than the eﬀect of trade policies. To overcome this shortcoming,
I instrument Tariﬀd,t with TrTariﬀd,t,d e ﬁned as
TrTariﬀd,t =
P
i Workerd,i,1991 ∗ Tariﬀi,t P
i Workerd,i,1991
TrTariﬀd,t, “non-scaled” tariﬀs, ignores the workers in non-traded industries. It weighs industry
tariﬀs with employment weights that sum to one for the share of people in traded goods in each
district. Thus, a district which has 1 percent workers in traded industries and another district
where 100 percent of workers are in traded industries will have the same value of TrTariﬀd,t
if, within the traded industries, the industrial composition is the same. Since the variation
in TrTariﬀd,t does not reﬂect the size of the traded sector within a district, the ”non-scaled”
tariﬀ would “overstate” the magnitude of any eﬀect trade policy might have. Yet, TrTariﬀd,t
forms a good instrument, as it is strongly correlated with the “scaled” tariﬀs and overcomes the
correlation with district initial poverty that is there by construction in Tariﬀd,t.T a b l e2p r e s e n t s
18These products also have minimum support prices ﬁxed by the Government of India.
17the results from the ﬁrst stage. Following equation 1, I estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Tariﬀdt = α + β · TrTariﬀdt + γt + δd + εdt (2)
with γt and δd deﬁned as above. Columns (1) and (3) present the correlation between the scaled
and nonscaled tariﬀs. There is a very strong relationship between the non-scaled and scaled
tariﬀs in both urban and rural India.
Another instrument is suggested by Figure 1, Panel G: tariﬀ changes are linearly related to
initial tariﬀs. One important principle in the tariﬀ changes was to standardize the tariﬀs (reduce
the standard deviation). A natural consequence of this is that the higher the tariﬀ initially, the
greater the reduction. Thus, I use pre-reform unscaled tariﬀs times a post dummy, in addition
to the unscaled tariﬀs, as instruments for tariﬀ reduction, namely:
Tariﬀdt = α + β · TrTariﬀdt + θ · Postt ∗ TrTariﬀd1987 + γt + δd + εdt (3)
Table 2 columns (2) and (4) include the interaction of the initial unscaled tariﬀ and a post-
liberalization dummy. The interaction of the non-scaled tariﬀs times a post dummy is also
strongly correlated with the scaled tariﬀs and adds explanatory power in all rural subsamples.
In the urban sector, the relationship is not as strong.
Data on outcome variables are available for 3 years: 1987, 1993 and 1999, while tariﬀ data are
available annually. It is not known how soon national policy changes aﬀect regional outcomes,
though probably there is some lag. If the 1993 outcomes were matched to the 1991 tariﬀs, 1993
would count as a “pre” year, while if they were matched to the 1992 tariﬀs, it would be a post
year. To avoid this problem, 1993 is omitted from the analysis. I use the earliest available data,
1987, for the “pre” tariﬀ measure, and the 1997 data as the “post” measure.
5R e s u l t s
I estimate four versions of equation 1: the OLS relationship using Tariﬀd,t; a reduced form using
TrTariﬀd,t; instrumenting for Tariﬀd,t using TrTariﬀd,t,;a n dﬁnally instrumenting for Tariﬀd,t
with both TrTariﬀd,t and with TrTariﬀd,1987∗Postt, where Postt is a dummy equal to 1 in year
1999. Since the dependent variable is an estimate, I weight the observations by the square root
18of the average number of households in a district across rounds. Year dummies are included to
account for macroeconomic shocks and time trends that aﬀect outcomes equally across India,
while district ﬁxed eﬀects absorb district-speciﬁc time-invariant heterogeneity. Outcomes of
districts within a state might be correlated, since industrial composition may be correlated
within a state, thus I cluster the standard errors at the state year level. The results for the
four outcomes of interest are presented in Table 3 Section I for rural India and Section II for
urban India. Each panel gives the results for a diﬀerent dependent variable. Columns (1) and
(5) give the OLS relationship, columns (2) and (6) the reduced form, and columns (3), (4), (7)
and (8), the IV results. In column (4) and (8), I use both the unscaled tariﬀsa n dt h ep r e - r e f o r m
unscaled tariﬀs times a post reform dummy as an instrument.
In rural India, for both measures of poverty, there is a strong statistically signiﬁcant negative
relationship between district level tariﬀsa n dp o v e r t y . T h ed e c l i n ei nt a r i ﬀsa sar e s u l to ft h e
sharp trade liberalization appears to have led to a relative increase in the poverty rate and
poverty gap in districts whose exposure to liberalization was more intense. The average district
experienced 5.5 percentage point reduction in the “scaled” district tariﬀs. The point estimates of
the various speciﬁcations are similar, and suggest that this 5.5 percentage point drop would lead
to an increase in the poverty rate of 3.2 to 4.6 percentage points, and a 1.1 to 1.8 percentage
point increase in the poverty gap. Given that poverty rate in the average district decreased
by 12.7 percentage points and that poverty gap decreased by 4 percentage points during the
entire decade, the eﬀects of exposure to liberalization are rather large. Surprisingly, there is no
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between trade exposure and poverty in urban India. Though
the point estimates are still negative, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is much smaller than in
rural India. There is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between trade liberalization and
either measure of inequality for the average district in neither rural nor urban India.
5.1 Why rural
The empirical literature on trade liberalization so far has focused predominantly on the man-
ufacturing sector, and urban areas because these were the areas most commonly aﬀected by
trade liberalization (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004). Thus, it is rather surprising that the eﬀect
19of trade liberalization on districts is more pronounced in rural India than in urban India.19 A
close look at the evolution of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers in Figure 1 suggests an explanation.
Agriculture was not omitted from the 1991 reforms in India. Tariﬀs of agricultural products fell
in line with tariﬀs of manufacturing and other goods. While quantity restrictions and licensing
requirements on both the import and export of agricultural products (out of a concern for food
security) were removed later than on other goods, the share of agricultural products that could
be freely imported jumped from 7 percent in 1989 to 40 percent in 1998. Between 1998 and
2001 this number reached more than 80 percent.
In addition, the agricultural tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers are strongly correlated. The post-
liberalization data (the 55th round of the NSS) was collected from mid 1999 to mid 2000,
right when the bulk of the removal of NTB was taking place. Thus the tariﬀ measure may
be capturing the eﬀect of both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers and reﬂect the short term eﬀect
of the change in relative price of agricultural products on the extensive rural population. I
construct separate measures of agricultural tariﬀs and mining and manufacturing tariﬀst h a ta
district faces and regress district poverty and inequality on these measures of trade policy. Table
A2 in the appendix reveals that the results are driven by agricultural tariﬀs.20 There is little
relationship between mining and manufacturing tariﬀs and district outcomes, though, due to the
large standard errors of the point estimates, I can not reject for any of the outcomes and for any
of the subsamples, that the eﬀect of mining and manufacturing tariﬀs and of agricultural tariﬀs
is the same. The ﬁnding is not that surprising; manufacturing and mining workers represent
only 6 percent of workers in the typical rural district — thus it is plausible that even if trade
liberalization had a sizeable eﬀect on their wellbeing or relative earnings, it would not be reﬂected
in district-level outcomes.
Furthermore, people involved in agriculture are the most vulnerable, often with little access
to insurance devices. There is no shortage of press accounts on farmers committing suicide in the
face of adverse shocks in India. Manufacturing workers, on the other hand, tend to be relatively
19On the other hand, rural areas are where the poor people in India are concentrated. At the eve of the 1991
reforms, both poverty rates and poverty depth were almost double in rural areas (40 versus 22.8 percent poverty
rate and 9 versus 4.7 percent poverty depth).
20Note that the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients in table A2 are not interpretable as the measures of agricultural
and mining and manufacturing tariﬀs are not scaled by the share of population employed in the particular sector.
20richer than agricultural workers: signiﬁcant decline in income may not be enough to push them
below the poverty line.
5.2 Robustness
The eﬀects of liberalization identiﬁed in this paper could be incorrect if measures of trade liber-
alization were correlated with omitted time-varying variables that aﬀect poverty and inequality.
In this section, I ﬁrst examine whether districts with diﬀerent initial industrial compositions
were on diﬀerent growth paths. I then determine whether pre-existing conditions within dis-
tricts are correlated with subsequent tariﬀ changes. Finally, I measure whether “initial” (1987)
conditions other than industrial composition in districts are correlated with subsequent changes
in poverty, and if so, whether they are driving the results.
To address the concern that districts with diﬀerent industrial composition may be experi-
encing diﬀerent time trends in poverty and inequality that are (spuriously) correlated with tariﬀ
changes, I perform a falsiﬁcation test. In particular, I test whether changes in poverty and in-
equality in the two periods prior to the reform (from 1983 to 1987) are correlated with measures
of trade liberalization from 1987 to1997.21 I use the four speciﬁcations (OLS, reduced form, and
both IV speciﬁcations), but now using 1983 and 1987 outcomes as pre and post, rather than the
1987 and 1999 outcomes. The results are presented in Table 4. In both urban and rural areas,
there seems to be no correlation between tariﬀ changes and the pre-reform trend in any of the
outcomes.
In Tables 5 and 6, I investigate the possibility that the results might be driven by con-
vergence or omitted variables.22 I control for time-varying eﬀect of various pre-reform district
characteristics as well as initial levels of outcomes, by including the interaction of these initial
characteristics and a post liberalization dummy, estimating:
ydt = α + β · Tariﬀdt + θ · Postt · Xd,1987 + γt + δd + εdt (4)
In all speciﬁcations I include in Xd,1987 initial industrial composition in the district (namely
21Note that the analysis can be performed only at the region level as district identiﬁers are not available in the
38th round of the NSS.
22I present the analysis only for the rural sample from now on as the eﬀect of trade liberalization in the urban
sector can not be precisely estimated.
21percentage of workers in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, trade, transport, services - workers
in construction are the omitted category), percentage literate and the share of scheduled caste
and scheduled tribes population. I sequentially add as controls the initial level of the log of mean
per capita expenditure in the district, the pre-reform trend in the outcome variable (the diﬀerence
between its 1983 and 1987 value), and ﬁnally the initial value of the dependent variable itself
instrumented by its value in 1983. I also allow for diﬀerential time trends in district outcomes
across states with pro-employer, pro-worker and neutral labor laws by including post times
labor law ﬁxed eﬀects.23 In columns (1)-(4), I use only TrTariﬀd,t as an instrument for Tariﬀd,t,
while in columns (5)-(8), I instrument the scaled tariﬀ with both TrTariﬀd,t, and the initial level
interacted with a post liberalization dummy. Columns (4) and (8) include the instrumented
value of the lagged dependent variable, where the 1983 level is used as an instrument for the
1987 level.24
The inclusion of district initial characteristics does not substantially change the results at
the district level. Controlling for initial per-capita expenditure or pre-reform outcome reduces
the size of the point estimates (from 0.8 to 0.44 for poverty rate and from 0.32 to 0.12 for poverty
gap when the non-scaled tariﬀ is the only instrument, and from 0.68 to 0.45 for poverty rate
and from 0.21 to 0.12 for poverty gap when both the non-scaled tariﬀ and its initial level are
used as instruments). It may be that some of the variation in poverty depth and incidence that
equation 1 attributed to trade liberalization was in fact due to convergence. According to these
corrected estimates, the decline in tariﬀs increased relative poverty incidence by about 2 and
poverty gap by 0.6 percentage points in the average district.
I also address the concern that some other reforms concurrent with trade liberalization may
be driving the results. In particular, in 1991 the government of India increased the number
of de-licensed industries and speciﬁed a list of industries for automatic approval for foreign
direct investment.25 Substantial reforms were initiated in the ﬁnancial and banking sector
23Indian states are classiﬁed as having pro-worker, neutral, or pro-employer labor laws by Besley and Burgess
(2004).
24Including the actual value would be equivalent to regressing changes on levels: if there is mean reversion and
measurement error, the coeﬃcient could be biased. In fact, the size of the coeﬃcient on the initial level of the
outcomes suggests implausibly strong convergence.
25Foreign investment was tightly regulated prior to 1991. Foreign companies needed to obtain speciﬁcp r i o r
approval from the Indian government and foreign investment was limited to 40 percent. In 1991, the government
22as well. Following the same methodology as in the construction of district tariﬀs, I construct
district employment-weighted share of license-industries and district employment-weighted share
of industries that are open to foreign direct investment.26 The number of bank branches per
capita in a district captures the potentially confounding eﬀect of banking reforms.27
In Table 6, I replicate the speciﬁcations presented in Table 5 including these time-varying
district level measures of reforms. The eﬀect of trade liberalization on poverty is completely
insensitive to the additional controls. There is no correlation between poverty and the number
of bank branches per capita nor share of industries under a license. A larger share of industries
open to FDI, however, is associated with faster reduction in poverty. As globalization is typically
deﬁned not only as trade liberalization but also opening to foreign investment, it is important
to emphasize this ﬁnding. It also reconciles Gordon Hanson’s conclusion in another paper with
similar methodology in this volume that more globalized areas in Mexico experienced a larger
increase in labor income with the ﬁnding that trade liberalization slowed poverty reduction
in more exposed districts in India. Hanson’s deﬁnition of exposure to globalization takes into
account the share of maquiladora value added in state GDP, the share of FDI in state GDP, and
the share of imports and exports in state GDP, while the main ﬁndings of this study concern
the consequences of tariﬀ liberalization.
In Table A3 in the appendix I investigate the role of imports versus exports, in addition to
FDI, by including the district employment-weighted industry imports and exports. I use 1987
import/export data for the pre-reform period, and the 1993-1997 annual average for the post-
reform period. Since imports and exports are the endogenous response to trade policy, exchange
rate shocks, foreign demand etc., these regressions do not warrant a causal interpretation, yet
they illustrate that imports are associated with higher, while exports with lower incidence of
poverty. These correlations are in-line with the ﬁndings in Goldberg and Pavcnik’s study in this
created a list of high technology and high investment priority industries with automatic permission for foreign
equity share up to 51 percent. Over the 1990s this list was gradually expanded.
26Data on policies regarding industrial delicensing and opening to foreign direct investment were compiled from
various publications of the Handbook of Industrial Statistics.
27The Indian government heavily regulates private and public banks, as it considers the banking system an
integral tool in its eﬀorts to meet a number of social goals, such as poverty reduction. Indeed, Burgess and Pande
(2004) have shown that rural bank branch expansion over the 1980s lead to reduction in poverty.
23volume. Goldberg and Pavcnik investigate the eﬀect of Colombia’s trade liberalization on urban
unemployment, informality, minimum wage compliance and poverty, by exploiting variation in
the timing and magnitude of tariﬀ reductions across manufacturing sectors. While they ﬁnd no
robust relationship between tariﬀ changes and various labor market outcomes, higher exposure
to import competition is associated with greater likelihood of unemployment, informality and
poverty, while higher exports correlate with lower informality, poverty and better minimum wage
compliance.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
So far this paper has established that, whatever the India-wide eﬀects of trade liberalization
were, rural areas with high concentration of industries that were disproportionately aﬀected by
tariﬀ reductions, experienced slower progress in poverty reduction. However, for these areas,
there was no discernible eﬀect on inequality.
The regionally disparate eﬀects of liberalization are not consistent with standard trade theory.
In the hypothetical world of a standard trade model, with perfect factor mobility across regions,
labor would migrate in response to wage and price shocks, equalizing the incidence of poverty
across regions. Estimating equation 1 would yield an estimate of β equal to zero, indicating that
the local intensity of liberalization has no eﬀect on local poverty.
The interpretation of estimates of equation 1 as eﬀects of liberalization on regional outcomes
is correct only if labor is immobile across geographical districts within India in the short to
medium-run, that is, if each district represents a separate labor market. While this represents
an immediate departure from standard trade theory, the assumption is realistic for the case of
India: the absence of mobility is striking. Moreover, the pattern of migration has remained
remarkably constant through time, with no visible increase after the economic reforms of 1991.
Table 7 presents some estimates of migration for urban and rural India based on the 3
rounds of the NSS (1983, 1987 and 1999) that included questions on the migration particulars of
household members. Overall migration is not low – 20-23 percent of rural and 31-33 percent of
urban residents have changed location of residence at least once in their lifetime. Most migrants
are women relocating at marriage: around 40 percent of females in rural and urban India report
24ac h a n g ei nl o c a t i o n ,v e r s u s7p e r c e n to fm e ni nr u r a la n d2 6p e r c e n to fm e ni nu r b a nl o c a t i o n s .
However, the migration most relevant for this study is short-run movement (within the past 10
years) of people across district boundaries or within district across diﬀerent sectors (i.e. from an
urban area to a rural one, or vice versa). Only 3-4 percent of people living in rural areas reported
changing either district or sector within the past 10 years. Again the percentage of women so
doing is double the share of men. For people living in urban areas, the percentage of migrants
is substantially higher. Yet, less than 0.5 percent of the population in rural and 4 percent of the
population in urban areas moved for reasons economic consideration (or employment).
These low migration ﬁgures combined with a second characteristic of India’s economy, namely
the large and growing disparities in income across Indian states, challenge the standard theoret-
ical framework. Ahluwalia(2001), Datt and Ravallion (2002), Sachs et al. (2002), Bandyopad-
hyay (2003) and others document signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the level of state GDP per capita and
growth rate of state output.
Even if there is little migration across districts, there could be high levels of reallocation
within districts, across industries. Topalova (2004b) examines whether, as standard trade theory
predicts, there is intersectoral reallocation of labor and capital. There is no evidence of signiﬁcant
reallocation in the sample of all Indian states, though in the sample of Indian states with
ﬂexible labor laws,28 employment is positively correlated with industry tariﬀs. This correlation
is consistent with previous ﬁndings of faster growth of output and employment (Besley and
Burgess, 2004) and a higher elasticity of labor demand with respect to output price in states
with ﬂexible labor laws (Hasan et al., 2003). Topalova (2004b) also examines whether these
diﬀerences in the institutional environment and microeconomic ﬂexibility aﬀected the impact of
liberalization: the most pronounced eﬀects on poverty occurred in areas with inﬂexible labor
laws (those that saw no change in industrial structure in response to trade liberalization) while
inequality rose as a result of trade liberalization in areas with ﬂexible labor laws.
Topalova (2004b) further investigates whether the adjustment came through the price sys-
tem, by looking at the eﬀect of tariﬀ changes on wages and wage premia and ﬁnds substantial
28Besley and Burgess (2004) classify Indian states as pro-worker, pro-employer or neutral, based on amendments
of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hasan et al. (2003) combine these categories with the ranking of the investment
climate in Indian states from a survey of managers conducted by the World Bank, in order to classify states as
having ﬂexible or inﬂexible labor laws. Topalova (2004b) adopts Hasan et al. (2003)’s classiﬁcation.
25adjustment in wages and industry premia, including industry premia of agricultural workers. In
the next paper in this volume Goh and Javorcik ﬁnd that in Poland, workers in sectors with
the largest tariﬀ declines experienced the highest increase in wages; in India, these workers suf-
fered the highest relative decrease in wage premia. Goh and Javorcik posit that in Poland’s
case, ﬁrms responded to higher import competition by increasing productivity and rewarded
the increased labor productivity with higher wages. Topalova (2004a) ﬁnds similar results in
India: micro evidence suggests that ﬁrms in industries that were relatively more liberalized ex-
perienced higher productivity and productivity growth. However, in India, these trade induced
productivity increases were likely not shared with the workers or were insuﬃcient to oﬀset the
relative downward pressure on factor returns.
The mechanisms discussed above are consistent with a speciﬁc factor model of trade in which
labor is the speciﬁc factor in the short run. Rigid labor markets fostered by labor market regu-
lations in parts of India prevented the reallocation of factors in the face of trade liberalization
in those areas. Changes in relative output prices led to changes in relative sector-returns to the
speciﬁc factors. As those employed in traded industries were not at the top of the income distri-
bution on the eve of the trade reform, the relative fall in wages contributed to the slower poverty
reduction. This eﬀect was aggravated by the slower overall growth in registered manufacturing
employment in areas with inﬂexible labor laws, which retarded the pull out of poverty of the
poorest subsistence farmers. In contrast, areas in which reallocation was easier, and growth was
faster (because of labor laws), were shielded from the eﬀect of trade liberalization. In those
areas, the changes in the income distribution seem to have taken place in the high end, as some
workers tapped into the beneﬁts of liberalization, thereby increasing the consumption inequality.
This is the ﬁrst (to my knowledge) study to document such a relationship between trade
liberalization and poverty within a developing or developed country. The ﬁndings are important
from a policy perspective as an increasing number of developing countries pursue policies of trade
liberalization, hoping to boost economic growth, raise living standards, and reduce poverty. This
paper does not measure the overall eﬀect of trade liberalization on income growth and poverty
alleviation. There was a substantial reduction in poverty in India over the 1990s, which trade
r e f o r m sm a yh a v eb o o s t e do fs l o w e dd own. This paper establishes that diﬀerent regions within
India experienced diﬀerential eﬀects of trade liberalization. Those areas that were more exposed
26to potential foreign competition did not reap as much of the beneﬁts (or bore a disproportionate
share of the burden) of liberalization in terms of poverty reduction.
A critical component to the ﬁndings of this study, as well as the study on Colombia in this
volume, is the absence of labor mobility in the short- to medium-run. Workers do not relocate
from sectors that should be contracting to those that should be expanding fast enough, thus
impeding one of the main mechanisms generating beneﬁts from trade. Enhancing labor mobility
will likely minimize the adjustment costs to trade opening. This study presents some evidence
to this eﬀect: the impact of trade on relative poverty in India was most pronounced in areas
with inﬂexible labor laws, where labor mobility was hindered. If some of the immobility of labor
is institutionally driven, then complementary measures to trade opening, such as labor market
reform, can ease the shock of liberalization and minimize its unequalizing eﬀects.
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31Dep. Var: Tariff1987-Tariff1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Real Wage 0.037
(0.062)
Share of Non-production Workers 0.312
(0.399)








Growth Log Output 82-87 -0.038
(0.061)
Growth Log Employment 82-87 0.024
(0.083)
R2 0.093 0.096 0.091 0.096 0.094 0.090 0.092 0.091
Obs 135 135 135 135 134 135 135 135








R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
Obs 315 274 315 315
Table 1. Tariff Declines and Pre-Reform Industrial Characteristics
Panel A. Evidence from the ASI
Panel B. Evidence from the NSS, Rural and Urban Pooled
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10 percent level of confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent 
level by **, and at the 1 percent level by ***.  All regressions include  indicators for industry use type: i.e. Capital goods, Consumer 
Durables, Consumer Non Durables, and Intermediate. In Panel A, regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of factories. 
Data are from the 1987 ASI and cover mining and manufacturing industries. In Panel B, regressions are weighted by the square root of 
the number of workers in each industry in the 1987 NSS. Urban and Rural sample are pooled and an indicator for urban is included. 
Separate regressions for the urban and rural sample exhibit similar patterns. Note that cereals and oilseeds cultivation has been treated as 
a non-traded industry, because imports of these agricultural products were canalized (restricted only to state trading monopolies) until 
2000.DepVar: Tariff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TrTariff 0.356 *** 0.633 *** 0.407 *** 0.687 ***
(0.090) (0.089) (0.091) (0.150)
TrTariff*Post 0.288 *** 0.214 *
(0.051) (0.118)
R2 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.91
Obs 728 728 724 724
Note: All regressions include year and district dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
corrected for clustering at the state year level. Regressions are weighted by the square root of 
the number of people in a district. Significance at the 10 percent level of confidence is 
represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 percent level by ***.
I. RURAL II. URBAN









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff Measure -0.287 ** -0.297 *** -0.834 *** -0.687 *** -0.215 -0.065 -0.156 -0.403
(0.118) (0.084) (0.250) (0.225) (0.190) (0.156) (0.353) (0.275)
Obs 725 725 725 725 703 703 703 703
Tariff Measure -0.129 *** -0.114 *** -0.319 *** -0.206 *** -0.084 -0.032 -0.076 -0.131
(0.038) (0.021) (0.073) (0.075) (0.052) (0.046) (0.101) (0.087)
Obs 725 725 725 725 703 703 703 703
Tariff Measure -0.086 -0.094 -0.265 -0.161 0.092 0.108 0.257 0.213
(0.154) (0.082) (0.228) (0.183) (0.094) (0.115) (0.295) (0.250)
Obs 725 725 725 725 703 703 703 703
Tariff Measure -0.016 -0.020 -0.057 -0.020 0.034 0.090 0.215 0.172
(0.066) (0.042) (0.115) (0.071) (0.062) (0.066) (0.174) (0.144)
Obs 725 725 725 725 703 703 703 703
Panel A. Dependent variable: Poverty Rate
Table3. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Poverty and Inequality in Indian Districts
I. RURAL II. URBAN
Note: All regressions include year and district dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the state year level. Regressions are weighted 
by the square root of the number of people in a district. Significance at the 10 percent level of confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 
percent level by ***.
Panel D. Dependent variable: Log Deviation of Consumption
Panel C. Dependent variable: StdLog Consumption









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff Change 0.065 0.842 0.746 -0.092 0.274 0.375
(0.571) (0.851) (0.762) (0.373) (0.563) (0.576)
TrTariff Change 0.333 0.148
(0.326) (0.289)
R2 0.001 0.033 0.002 0.004
Obs 62 62 62 62 60 60 60 60
Tariff Change 0.007 0.114 0.091 -0.079 -0.194 -0.170
(0.197) (0.273) (0.240) (0.117) (0.238) (0.211)
TrTariff Change 0.045 -0.105
(0.108) (0.128)
R2 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.016
Obs 62 62 62 62 60 60 60 60
Tariff Change 0.178 0.008 -0.119 -0.055 0.180 0.025
(0.131) (0.287) (0.260) (0.170) (0.320) (0.260)
TrTariff Change 0.003 0.097
(0.114) (0.160)
R2 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004
Obs 62 62 62 62 60 60 60 60
Tariff Change 0.074 -0.023 -0.094 -0.102 0.118 0.041
(0.071) (0.141) (0.119) (0.107) (0.213) (0.169)
TrTariff Change -0.009 0.064
(0.055) (0.108)
R2 0.011 0.000 0.013 0.004
Obs 62 62 62 62 60 60 60 60
Table 4. Pre-Reform Test. Correlation Between Pre-Reform Trends in Outcomes and Tariff Change
I. RURAL II. URBAN
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the state level. Regressions are weighted by the 
square root of the number of people in the region.  Dependent variables are Outcome1983 minus Outcome1987. 
Significance at the 10 percent level of confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 percent 
level by ***.
Panel A. Dependent variable: Poverty Rate
Panel B. Dependent variable: Poverty Gap
Panel C. Dependent variable: StdLog Consumption
Panel D. Dependent variable: Log Deviation of Consumption(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff Measure -0.607 *** -0.434 ** -0.441 -0.444 ** -0.418 *** -0.426 *** -0.522 ** -0.456 ***
(0.232) (0.217) (0.281) (0.208) (0.141) (0.163) (0.206) (0.134)
Logmean 0.469 *** 0.340 *** 0.469 *** 0.338 ***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.034) (0.041)
Trend -0.322 *** -0.322 ***
(0.067) (0.067)
Lagged 43 -0.419 *** -0.417 ***
(0.123) (0.120)
Tariff Measure -0.235 *** -0.175 *** -0.196 ** -0.118 * -0.121 ** -0.124 ** -0.177 ** -0.118 ***
(0.075) (0.066) (0.090) (0.069) (0.062) (0.063) (0.080) (0.041)
Logmean 0.161 *** 0.126 *** 0.162 *** 0.126 ***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Trend -0.319 *** -0.318 ***
(0.064) (0.064)
Lagged 43 -0.576 *** -0.576 ***
(0.144) (0.131)
Tariff Measure -0.192 -0.244 -0.258 -0.057 -0.083 -0.078 -0.175 0.006
(0.258) (0.260) (0.249) (0.232) (0.197) (0.203) (0.187) (0.202)
Logmean -0.140 *** -0.047 -0.136 *** -0.045
(0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041)
Trend -0.635 *** -0.635 ***
(0.063) (0.063)
Lagged 43 -0.382 -0.410
(0.278) (0.261)
Tariff Measure -0.009 -0.037 -0.095 0.044 -0.005 -0.004 -0.079 0.020
(0.131) (0.120) (0.098) (0.108) (0.081) (0.082) (0.074) (0.097)
Logmean -0.078 *** -0.031 * -0.077 *** -0.030
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Trend -0.584 *** -0.584 ***
(0.100) (0.100)
Lagged 43 -0.570 * -0.547 *
(0.309) (0.309)
Table 5. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Poverty and Inequality in Rural India Controlling for Initial Characteristics and Other Reforms
Note:  All regressions include year, district dummies, state labor laws-year dummies and pre-reform literacy, share of SC/ST population and 
industrial structure interacted with a post dummy. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a district/region. The 
data are from the 43rd and 55th rounds of the NSS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the state year level. 
Significance at the 10 percent level of confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 percent level by ***.  In 
columns (1)-(4), the district tariff is instrumented by the non-scaled tariff.  In columns (5)-(8), the district tariff is instrumented by the non-
scaled tariff and the interaction of pre-reform non-scaled tariff and a post dummy. In column (4) and (8) the level of the lagged dependent 
variable is instrumented with the value of the dependent variables in 1983.
Panel A. Dependent variable: Poverty Rate. District Level (Obs=725)
Panel B. Dependent variable: Poverty Gap. District Level (Obs=725)
Panel C. Dependent variable: StdLog Consumption. District Level (Obs=725)
Panel D. Dependent variable: Log Deviation of Consumption. District Level (Obs=725)
I. IV-TrTariff II. IV-TrTariff, Init TrTariff(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tariff Measure -0.573 *** -0.446 ** -0.428 -0.447 ** -0.413 *** -0.402 *** -0.495 ** -0.445 ***
(0.222) (0.201) (0.274) (0.202) (0.149) (0.152) (0.203) (0.129)
Logmean 0.485 *** 0.353 *** 0.486 *** 0.350 ***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.033) (0.040)
Trend -0.310 *** -0.310 ***
(0.068) (0.068)
Lagged 43 -0.441 *** -0.441 ***
(0.135) (0.133)
FDI opened industries -0.051 -0.215 *** -0.134 * -0.152 *** -0.055 -0.216 *** -0.132 * -0.152 ***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.073) (0.055) (0.059) (0.054) (0.069) (0.052)
License industries 0.008 0.050 0.069 0.020 0.012 0.051 0.067 0.021
(0.059) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.059) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073)
Bank branches per capita 3802 *** 1013 1285 1293 3787 *** 1001 1304 1291
(789) (766) (861) (1125) (771) (770) (894) (1117)
Tariff Measure -0.224 *** -0.181 *** -0.190 ** -0.118 -0.122 * -0.117 * -0.169 ** -0.115 ***
(0.073) (0.069) (0.093) (0.073) (0.066) (0.063) (0.082) (0.042)
Logmean 0.166 *** 0.128 *** 0.168 *** 0.129 ***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
Trend -0.313 *** -0.312 ***
(0.063) (0.063)
Lagged 43 -0.604 *** -0.607 ***
(0.160) (0.147)
FDI opened industries -0.008 -0.064 *** -0.028 -0.039 ** -0.011 -0.066 *** -0.028 -0.040 ***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015)
License industries -0.002 0.012 0.021 0.005 0.000 0.014 0.022 0.005
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Bank branches per capita 1213 *** 260 330 115 1204 *** 242 324 110
(232) (224) (267) (366) (224) (219) (268) (342)
Tariff Measure -0.175 -0.213 -0.244 -0.066 -0.061 -0.063 -0.162 0.004
(0.255) (0.260) (0.251) (0.228) (0.201) (0.208) (0.193) (0.204)
Logmean -0.147 *** -0.050 -0.142 *** -0.048
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039)
Trend -0.622 *** -0.622 ***
(0.069) (0.068)
Lagged 43 -0.316 -0.356
(0.324) (0.295)
FDI opened industries -0.089 * -0.040 -0.054 -0.054 -0.092 * -0.045 -0.057 -0.051
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
License industries 0.067 0.054 0.033 0.037 0.070 0.059 0.035 0.035
(0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.044) (0.046) (0.052) (0.051)
Bank branches per capita 1119 1964 * 1249 1090 1109 1922 * 1226 1081
(1057) (1091) (964) (1032) (1075) (1109) (962) (1042)
Tariff Measure -0.002 -0.022 -0.089 0.040 0.008 0.007 -0.070 0.021
(0.119) (0.116) (0.097) (0.104) (0.081) (0.083) (0.076) (0.095)
Logmean -0.078 *** -0.029 * -0.077 *** -0.028 *
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Trend -0.579 *** -0.579 ***
(0.102) (0.102)
Lagged 43 -0.492 -0.463
(0.404) (0.388)
FDI opened industries -0.055 ** -0.029 -0.039 -0.023 -0.056 ** -0.030 -0.039 -0.025
(0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032)
License industries 0.044 ** 0.037 ** 0.024 0.013 0.044 ** 0.038 ** 0.025 0.015
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
Bank branches per capita 258 704 423 251 257 696 418 253
(510) (518) (436) (458) (509) (519) (436) (455)
Table 6. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Poverty and Inequality in Rural India Controlling for Initial Characteristics and Other Reforms
Note: All regressions include year, district dummies, state labor laws-year dummies and pre-reform literacy, share of SC/ST population and industrial 
structure interacted with a post dummy. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a district/region. The data are from the 43rd 
and 55th rounds of the NSS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the state year level. Significance at the 10 percent level of 
confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 percent level by ***.  In columns (1)-(4), the district tariff is instrumented by the 
non-scaled tariff.  In columns (5)-(8), the district tariff is instrumented by the non-scaled tariff and the interaction of pre-reform non-scaled tariff and a post 
dummy. In column (4) and (8) the level of the lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the value of the dependent variables in 1983.
Panel A. Dependent variable: Poverty Rate. District Level (Obs=725)
Panel B. Dependent variable: Poverty Gap. District Level (Obs=725)
Panel C. Dependent variable: Log Deviation of Consumption. District Level (Obs=725)
I. IV-TrTariff II. IV-TrTariff, Init TrTariff
Panel D. Dependent variable: Log Deviation of Consumption. District Level (Obs=725)1983 1987 1999 1983 1987 1999 1983 1987 1999
Place of Birth Different than Place of Residence 0.209 0.232 0.244 0.072 0.075 0.069 0.351 0.399 0.427
Moved within the past 10 years 0.094 0.102 0.097 0.047 0.048 0.040 0.144 0.160 0.156
Moved within the past 10 years, excluding migration within the same 
district and within the same sector (I.e. rural to rural and urban to urban)
0.029 0.032 0.036 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.039 0.044 0.051
Moved within the past 10 years from urban to rural  0.011 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.016
Moved within the past 10 years because of employment, excluding 
migration within the same district and within the same sector
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.001
Place of Birth Different than Place of Residence 0.316 0.329 0.333 0.270 0.268 0.256 0.366 0.396 0.418
Moved within the past 10 years 0.182 0.185 0.174 0.168 0.164 0.151 0.198 0.209 0.199
Moved within the past 10 years, excluding migration within the same 
district and within the same sector (I.e. rural to rural and urban to urban)
0.131 0.132 0.131 0.125 0.121 0.118 0.138 0.144 0.146
Moved within the past 10 years from rural to urban 0.080 0.080 0.076 0.073 0.070 0.065 0.087 0.091 0.089
Moved within the past 10 years because of employment, excluding 
migration within the same district and within the same sector
0.044 0.042 0.033 0.074 0.071 0.058 0.010 0.011 0.006
Panel B. Urban
Table 7.  Migration Patterns
All Male Female
Panel A. RuralFig. 1 Evolution of Tariffs in India
Correlation of Industry Tariffs in 1997 and 1987 Tariff Decline and Industry Tariffs in 1987
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1983 1988 1993 1999
Rural UrbanRURAL 38TH ROUND 1983 URBAN 38TH ROUND 1983
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Poverty Rate 379 0.429 0.173 Poverty Rate 372 0.439 0.147
Poverty Gap 379 0.117 0.067 Poverty Gap 372 0.122 0.051
Std Dev of Log Consumption 379 0.497 0.061 Std Dev of Log Consumption 372 0.540 0.065
Logarithmic Deviation 379 0.137 0.037 Logarithmic Deviation 372 0.163 0.042
Tariff - - Tariff - -
TrTariff - - TrTariff - -
Agricultral Tariff - - Agricultral Tariff - -
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff - - Mining and Manufacturing Tariff - -
RURAL 43rd ROUND 1987 URBAN 43rd ROUND 1987
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Poverty Rate 379 0.368 0.196 Poverty Rate 366 0.248 0.168
Poverty Gap 379 0.088 0.064 Poverty Gap 366 0.057 0.050
Std Dev of Log Consumption 379 0.456 0.085 Std Dev of Log Consumption 366 0.501 0.113
Logarithmic Deviation 379 0.120 0.046 Logarithmic Deviation 366 0.149 0.076
Poverty Gap Change in the 1980s 379 -0.029 0.062 Poverty Gap Change in the 1980s 364 -0.064 0.049
Poverty Rate Change in the 1980s 379 -0.061 0.164 Poverty Rate Change in the 1980s 364 -0.191 0.145
Std Dev Change in the 1980s 379 -0.040 0.081 Std Dev Change in the 1980s 364 -0.038 0.115
Log Deviation Change in the 1980s 379 -0.017 0.048 Log Deviation Change in the 1980s 364 -0.013 0.080
Tariff 364 0.081 0.080 Tariff 362 0.172 0.085
TrTariff 364 0.883 0.096 TrTariff 362 0.891 0.083
Agricultral Tariff 364 0.822 0.142 Agricultral Tariff 362 0.782 0.090
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 364 0.914 0.043 Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 362 0.923 0.576
Log Mean Per Capita Expenditure 379 5.065 0.252 Log Mean Per Capita Expenditure 366 5.389 0.274
Percent Literate 364 0.368 0.137 Percent Literate 362 0.591 0.094
Percent SC/ST 364 0.293 0.161 Percent SC/ST 362 0.154 0.064
Percent Farmers 364 0.816 0.103 Percent Farmers 362 0.194 0.101
Percent Manufacturing 364 0.056 0.045 Percent Manufacturing 362 0.191 0.088
Percent Mining 364 0.005 0.014 Percent Mining 362 0.013 0.041
Percent Service 364 0.065 0.037 Percent Service 362 0.264 0.073
Percent Trade 364 0.032 0.020 Percent Trade 362 0.217 0.045
Percent Transport 364 0.013 0.011 Percent Transport 362 0.073 0.025
RURAL 50th ROUND 1993 URBAN 50th ROUND 1993
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Poverty Rate 366 0.313 0.179 Poverty Rate 354 0.191 0.098
Poverty Gap 366 0.067 0.052 Poverty Gap 354 0.039 0.027
Std Dev of Log Consumption 366 0.428 0.088 Std Dev of Log Consumption 368 0.539 0.056
Logarithmic Deviation 366 0.105 0.048 Logarithmic Deviation 368 0.166 0.038
Tariff 364 0.072 0.074 Tariff 362 0.156 0.079
TrTariff 364 0.778 0.095 TrTariff 362 0.812 0.082
Agricultral Tariff 364 0.632 0.130 Agricultral Tariff 362 0.635 0.089
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 364 0.825 0.054 Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 362 0.837 0.063
RURAL 55th ROUND 1999 URBAN 55th ROUND 1999
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Poverty Rate 364 0.241 0.138 Poverty Rate 360 0.145 0.108
Poverty Gap 364 0.048 0.035 Poverty Gap 360 0.029 0.027
Std Dev of Log Consumption 364 0.463 0.106 Std Dev of Log Consumption 360 0.529 0.091
Logarithmic Deviation 364 0.116 0.042 Logarithmic Deviation 360 0.157 0.054
Tariff 364 0.026 0.022 Tariff 362 0.060 0.030
TrTariff 364 0.306 0.060 TrTariff 362 0.317 0.044
Agricultral Tariff 364 0.236 0.076 Agricultral Tariff 362 0.212 0.052
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 364 0.341 0.022 Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 362 0.336 0.030
Table A1. Summary Statistics(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agricultural Tariff -0.219 *** -0.213 *** -0.242 ** -0.240 **
(0.071) (0.070) (0.097) (0.102)
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 0.277 0.221 -0.154 -0.148
(0.318) (0.297) (0.163) (0.154)
Obs 725 725 725 703 703 703
Agricultural Tariff -0.081 *** -0.080 *** -0.066 ** -0.065 **
(0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 0.062 0.041 -0.072 -0.071
(0.123) (0.113) (0.049) (0.047)
Obs 725 725 725 703 703 703
Agricultural Tariff -0.110 * -0.110 * 0.060 0.060
(0.064) (0.062) (0.091) (0.092)
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 0.030 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.220) (0.208) (0.131) (0.129)
Obs 725 725 725 703 703 703
Agricultural Tariff -0.037 -0.035 0.053 0.053
(0.025) (0.025) (0.066) (0.066)
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff 0.073 0.064 0.024 0.022
(0.109) (0.111) (0.076) (0.074)
Obs 725 725 725 703 703 703
Note: All regressions include year and district dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the 
state year level. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a district. Significance at the 10 
percent level of confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 percent level by ***.
Table A2. Sectoral Tariffs and Poverty and Inequality in Rural and Urban India
I. RURAL II. URBAN
Panel D. Dependent variable: Log Deviation of Consumption
Panel C. Dependent variable: StdLog Consumption
Panel B. Dependent variable: Poverty Gap
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Poverty RateDepVar: Poverty Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Imports of All Traded Industries 0.010 0.009 *
(0.006) (0.005)
Imports of  Agriculture 0.009 0.007 0.017 * 0.016 *
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Imports of  Mining/Manufacture 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Exports of All Traded Industries -0.002 * -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Exports of Agriculture -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Exports of  Mining/Manufacture -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 * -0.001 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FDI opened industries -0.215 *** -0.230 *** -0.247 *** -0.251 *** -0.164 *** -0.169 *** -0.187 *** -0.188 ***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.051) (0.048)
License industries 0.048 0.064 0.056 0.055 0.020 0.034 0.031 0.029
(0.070) (0.076) (0.072) (0.072) (0.065) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069)
Bank branches per capita 872 863 963 957 861 1059 941 981
(685) (727) (710) (697) (1013) (1099) (1115) (1101)
Logmean 0.504 *** 0.500 *** 0.503 *** 0.502 ***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Lagged 43 -0.511 *** -0.468 *** -0.508 *** -0.495 ***
(0.128) (0.142) (0.137) (0.142)
Obs 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725
Note:  All regressions include year, district dummies, state labor laws-year dummies and pre-reform literacy, share of SC/ST population and industrial structure interacted with a 
post dummy. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a district/region. The data are from the 43rd and 55th rounds of the NSS. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the state year level. Significance at the 10 percent level of confidence is represented by a *, at the 5 percent level by **, and at the 1 
percent level by ***.  In columns (1)-(4), the district initial per capita expenditure interacted with a post dummy is included.  In columns (5)-(8), the level of the lagged dependent 
variable, instrumented with the value of the dependent variables in 1983, and interacted with a post dummy is included.
Table A3. Imports, Export and Poverty in Rural India